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CASE COMMENTS
pense involved in defending a union suit against him. Although Allis-
Chalmers has determined that the court enforcement of a union fine
does not "coerce" 'the worker within the Court's strained interpreta-
tion of the Taft-Hartley Act, the worker's freedom of choice is none-
theless restricted much more than before.
The significance of Natzke is not in its references to a contract of
union membership, but in -the labor policy of putting the weak union
in a better bargaining position. A recent trend in Supreme Court
decisions has been toward accomplishing this objective by a sacrifice
of the employee's rights guaranteed under the Labor-Management
Relations Act.45 Under the union security provision coupled with the
new union right to enforce its fines in court, the employee is required
to join the union and has little choice but 'to obey its commands.
46
While the approach toward internal strengthening of the union is
not without merit, well defined regulations set up by Congress would
seem appropriate rather than Court-made law based on "legal fabrica-
tions" and anomalous interpretations of existing labor law.
BRUCE CAMPBELL LECKIE
THE REGULATED PRACTICE
OF THE JAILHOUSE LAWYER
The regulations of the Atlanta Penitentiary provide that an in-
mate is not to receive assistance from another in the preparation of
any legal documents.' Four federal penitentiary prisoners attacked
41In addition to NLRB v. Allis-Chalmers Mfg. Co., 388 U.S. 175 (1967), the
Supreme Court in Vaca v. Sipes, 386 U.S. 171 (1967) drastically limited the em-
ployees' use of the § 3oi action which allows an employee to sue his employer
for breach of contract. In the dissenting opinion Justice Black states: "[F]inally,
the Court suggests that its decision 'furthers the interest of the union as statutory
agent.' I think this is the real reason for today's decision which entirely overlooks
the interests of the injured employee, the only one who has anything to lose." Id.
at 209.
"The Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit in Allis-Chalmers refused to allow
the union the benefit of a court enforced fine feeling this would frustrate "our
natural desire to maintain the historical liberty of the American working man
to remain free and to work without coercion from employers or from unions.
358 F.2d at 658. In allowing the union this advantage, the Supreme Court in Allis-
Chalmers did, however, limit its decision to "full union members," possibly imply-
ing that one who restricted his activity to mere payment of dues would not be
subject to this new form of union discipline. This restriction would seemingly base
the member's capacity to be fined on whether he has actually taken advantage of
the membership for which he has been required to pay and thus becomes a
"voluntary" union member.
'White v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211, 219 (N.D. Ga. 1967). This regulation
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this regulation by a petition for declaratory and injunctive relief
in White v. Blackwell.2 The prisoners alleged that the rules prohibit-
ing the legal assistance of other inmates hindered them in exercising
their constitutional right of free access to the courts. However, the
prison administration contended that the purpose of the rules was to
maintain prison discipline and that to permit jailhouse lawyers
would create an undesirable "power structure" within the prison.
White held that these rules would be invalid if literally interpreted
and enforced. The court stated that an amendment to the rules
which would reasonably regulate, but not prohibit, the practice of
the jailhouse lawyer would be acceptable.
Narrowly viewed, White may be interpreted as a decision resting
entirely upon administrative practice. The prison administration
allowed White, a jailhouse lawyer, to consult with the other prisoners
on legal matters even though this practice was contrary to the regula-
tions.3 Thus White may be merely indicating that the prison admin-
istration must be consistent in its drafting and enforcement of the
rules.
However, White may be a much broader decision resting on the
constitutional provisions of the right to counsel under the sixth
amendment, the reasonable access to the courts under the due process
clause of the fifth amendment, and freedom of speech under the
first amendment. 4 This broader interpretation stems from White's
apparent approval of the use of lay-attorneys. The court went beyond
the facts and said that even if the regulations were enforced strictly
as written so as to apply equally to all prisoners, then the rules would
still not be valid. The court stated that the prison officials could
regulate the giving of assistance but could not totally prohibit it.
The Supreme Court of the United States has repeatedly held that a
prison administration must not violate a prisoner's reasonable ac-
was adopted by the Warden in accordance with the guidelines of the United
States Bureau of Prisons.
2277 F. Supp. 211 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
31d. at 215.
'The first amendment rights of prisoners have received extensive consideration
in cases involving the prisoner's right to practice his religion. Generally these cases
indicate that although a prisoner has a right to practice his religion, he may not
do so to the detriment of prison discipline. See 45 U.N.C. L. REV. 535, 536-37 n.9
(1967); Note, Constitutional Rights of Prisoners: The Developing Law, 1io U. PA.
L. REV. 985, 997 (1962). Generally, any form of prisoner expression is regulated to
conform with the requirements of prison discipline. 40 S. CAL. L. REv. 407 (1967).
Thus, it appears that the jailhouse lawyer should be permitted to speak with
other inmates, provided that his actual communication does not interrupt the
normal course of prison life and the substance of the communication does not
encourage discontent or incite inmates to riot.
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cess to the courts.5 But the Supreme Court has defined reasonable ac-
cess as being the actual presentation of a petition in court.6 By permit-
ting the assistance of a jailhouse lawyer White has essentially extended
access to include effective access, the right of a prisoner to present a
more intelligible and therefore understandable petition to the court.
This principle is a departure from previous access cases, each deal-
ing with the right of a prisoner to use or even to be provided with
legal facilities such as libraries, books, and general legal materials.
These cases have been primarily concerned with the actual presenta-
tion of the appeal to the court.7 Roberts v. Peppersacks noted that
where a prisoner is seeking the use of legal materials to "'effect his
remedy' ",9 a constitutional issue is not presented because the pris-
oner has not been denied actual access to the courts. In re Allison o
noted that the primary function of the right to access is only to insure
that a prisoner receives a full and timely judicial review. Consequently,
the prison is under no constitutional duty to provide legal facilities for
prisoner research so long as access to the courts is not unreasonably
affected. Thus, courts have refused to interpret reasonable access to
mean effective access to the courts. White suggests that effective access
is the appropriate interpretation of reasonable access and offers a
means of implementing this theory through the use of jailhouse
lawyers.
As for the right to counsel, the Supreme Court has yet to hold that
a prisoner has a constitutional right to counsel for the filing of post-
conviction appeals.l The theory has been that the habeas corpus
'Dowd v. United States ex Tel. Cook, 34o U.S. 206 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255 (1942); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941); accord, DeWitt v. Pail,
366 F.2d 682 (gth Cir. 1966); Stiltner v. Rhay, 322 F.2d 314 (9th Cir. 1963); United
States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965); see May-
berry v. Prasse, 225 F. Supp. 752 (EM. Pa. 1963).
GSee Dowd v. United States ex rel. Cook, 340 U.S. 2o6 (1951); Cochran v. Kansas,
316 U.S. 255 (1942); Ex parte Hull, 312 U.S. 546 (1941).
Lee v. Tahash, 352 F.2d 970 (8th Cir. 1965); Williams v. Wilkens, 315 F.2d
396 (2d Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 852 (1963); Hatfield v. Bailleaux, 290
F.2d 632 (gth Cir. 1961), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 862 (g6i); Roberts v. Peppersack, 256
F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966); United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247
F. Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Barber v. Page, 239 F. Supp. 265 (E.D. Okla. 1965); In re
Allison, 57 Cal. Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193 (1967); In re Chessman, 44 Cal. 2d 1, 279
P.2d 24 (1955).
8256 F. Supp. 415 (D. Md. 1966).
DId. at 433.
"57 Cal. Rptr. 593, 425 P.2d 193 (1967).
""[I]t is important to recognize that the Supreme Court has not yet held that
it [representation by counsel for post-conviction remedies] is an indispensable
element of due process under the Constitution." Johnson v. Avery, 382 F.2d 353, 356
(6th Cir. 1967). It is interesting to note that the Supreme Court has recently held
that an indigent prisoner must be provided counsel in post-conviction proba-
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petition is a civil proceeding while the right to counsel under the sixth
amendment refers to criminal proceedings. 12 However, it should be
noted that federal courts may and do appoint counsel to aid an
indigent prisoner in articulating his appeal, when the court deems
it appropriate.'
3
Thus it appears that while not guaranteeing the right to counsel
for post-conviction appeals, the courts have recognized its importance.
As White noted, prisoners may receive legal assistance from voluntary
organizations such as law schools, bar associations, and legal aid
societies.14 White further indicates, and receives Fourth Circuit sup-
port for, the proposition that the prison administration could regulate
the practice of a jailhouse lawyer in accordance with the availa-
bility of other forms of legal assistance and the existence of a quali-
fied inmate.' 5 By permitting the practice of a jailhouse lawyer where
no other assistance is available, White has recognized the merit in
counsel for post-conviction appeals and may be holding that to deny
the prisoner the right to consult with a qualified inmate may be a
denial of the right to counsel.
Freedom of speech under the first amendment, in the context of
this case, is intertwined with the problem of unauthorized practice of
law.' 6 In White the prisoners raised the first amendment issue; the
court dismissed this contention by a footnote observation that there
was no first amendment restriction on speech except for "prohibi-
tions against unauthorized practice of law."' 7 However, if the peti-
tioner's activity is not protected speech because it is "unauthorized
practice," then is not the activity prohibited on the separate grounds
of being "unauthorized practice"?
The question as to whether the jailhouse lawyer has a right to
tion proceedings. Mempa v. Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967). This recent step indicates
that the Supreme Court may be prepared to extend the right to counsel to
other post-conviction stages. Further, several federal courts have noted the
desirability of appointing counsel for post-conviction appeals. Taylor v. Pegelow,
335 F.2d 147 (4th Cir. 1964); Dillon v. United States, 307 F.2d 445 (9th Cir.
1962); United States ex tel. Wissenfield v. Wilkins, 281 F.2d 707 (2d Cir. sg6o).
'2See, e.g., Flowers v. Oklahoma, 356 F.2d 916 (soth Cir. 1966); Barker v. Ohio,
33o F.2d 594 (6th Cir. 1964); Miller v. Gladden, 228 F. Supp. 802 (D. Ore. 1964);
see 46 TExAs L. REv. 566, 570 (s968) for a discussion of the right to counsel in
relation to the jailhouse lawyer.
"'See, e.g., Coleman v. Peyton, 362 F.2d 905 (4 th Cir. 1966); see also 28 U.S.C.A.
§ 1915(d) (1966)-
"See, 19 STAN. L. REV. 887 (1967) and 1967 Wis. L. REv. 514 (1967) for a
discussion of various legal assistance program for prisoners.
2-Arey v. Peyton, 378 F.2d 930 (4th Cir. 1967).
'6Cf., Brotherhood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State
Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1963); NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
rXWhite v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211, 218 n.4 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
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practice law has arisen within both state and federal jurisdictions. It
is accepted that states either through the auspices of their bars or by
legislative action have the right to determine the qualifications for
entrance to their bars and to regulate the practice of law' s within
their jurisdiction.'9 Consequently, in Siegel v. Ragen2o when a state
penitentiary confiscated material used by an inmate in his "law de-
partment," the issue of whether the inmate was practicing law illegally
was summarily dismissed because "[O]nly the Supreme Court of
Illinois has the power to license persons to practice law within
the limits of that State." 2'
The federal government has the power to determine who will
practice within its courts, and in the absence of special federal legis-
lation,22 the state has the power to determine who may practice within
its boundaries.23 Presently, there is no federal statute which authorizes
,the practice of a jailhouse lawyer. The argument that 28 U.S.C.A. §
224224 is such a statute was dismissed by Johnson v. Avery.
25
The statute provides that a habeas corpus petition may be signed and
verified by the person for whose relief it is intended or by someone
acting in his behalf. Johnson indicated that the section covers situa-
tions where the appellant was unable to sign or verify his petition
due to a mental or physical handicap rather than due to a lack of
intelligence or legal training which would keep him from drafting his
own papers. Thus, the weight of authority would not permit the
IsThe practice of law includes both advising another as to his legal problem
and the preparation of legal papers, pleadings or documents. GA. CODE ANN.
§ 9-4oi (Supp. 1967); T.NN. CODE ANN. § 29-302 (955). See, Annot., 151 A.L.R.
781 pt. 2 (1944).
19Konigsberg v. State Bar of Calif., 266 U.S. 36 (ig6i); In re Anastaplo, 366
US. 82 (1961); Emmons v. Smitt, 149 F.2d 869 (6th Cir. 1945); Niklaus v. Simmons,
196 F. Supp. 691 (D. Neb. 1961). It should be noted that the interests of states
are sometimes deemed less significant when a constitutional issue has been raised,
but this has only arisen in solicitation cases involving trained attorneys. Brother-
hood of Railroad Trainmen v. Virginia ex rel. Virginia State Bar, 377 U.S. 1 (1963);
NAACP v. Button, 371 U.S. 415 (1963).
208o F.2d 785 (7 th Cir. 1950).
"Id. "at 788. Accord, United States ex rel. Wakeley v. Pennsylvania, 247 F-
Supp. 7 (E.D. Pa. 1965); Edmundson v. Harris, 239 F. Supp. 359 (W.D. Mo. 1965);
Brabson v. Wilkins, 19 N.Y.2d 433, 227 N.E.2d 384, 28o N.Y.S.2d 561 (1967).
"E.g., Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963).
2Sperry v. Florida ex rel. The Florida Bar, 373 U.S. 379 (1963); Spanos v.
Skouras Theatres Corp., 364 F.2d 161 (2d Cir. 1966); Grace v. Allen, 407 S.W.2d
321 (Tex. Civ. App. 1966).
2'28 U.S.C.A. § 2242 (1959) states, "Applications for a writ of habeas corpus
shall be in writing signed and verified by the person for whose relief it is
intended or by someone acting in his behalf."
'382 F.2d 353 (6th Cir. 1967), rev'g 252 F. Supp. 783 (M.D. Tenn. 1966).
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legal assistance of a jailhouse lawyer since it would be an illegal prac-
tice of law.
The rationale for imposing limitations on the practice is to pro-
tect the general public from unlearned and unskilled legal advisors.
26
However, such a policy consideration may not be applicable to the
jailhouse lawyer situation as the practice would have no direct
detrimental effect upon the general public. Within a prison popu-
lation any legal advice may be more beneficial to a prisoner than no
assistance at all.27 Furthermore, the court in White appears to have
been influenced by the fact that there were no voluntary organiza-
tions such as law schools, bar associations, or legal aid societies that
could advise prisoners on their post-conviction remedies.
28
White, then, may be purely an administrative decision suggest-
ing that the prison administration should regulate the practice of
the jailhouse lawyer in accordance with White's legal assistance re-
quirement for post-conviction appeals. However, by permitting the
regulated practice of jailhouse lawyers White has implied various
constitutional mandates: reasonable access to the courts may now
include effective access; prisoners have a right to either trained or
untrained legal assistance in filing their post-conviction appeals; such
a practice will not be precluded by the possibility that the activity
could be construed as an unauthorized practice of law. Although
these constitutional issues remain unanswered, White appears to
offer a reasonable solution to the predicament of the less educated
and indigent inmate who is truly incapable of formulating his own
appeal.
DAVID D. REDMOND
'Cape May County Bar Ass'n v. Ludlam, 45 N.J. 121, 211 A.2d 780 (1965);
Auerbacher v. Wood, 142 N.J. Eq. 484, 59 A.2d 863 (1948); In re Wysell, io App.
Div. 2d 199, 198 N.Y.S.2d 456 (1960); West Virginia State Bar v. Earley, 144 W.Va.
504, log S.E.2d 420 (1959). See In re Holovachlea, 245 Ind. 483, 198 N.E.2d 381
(1964); Menz v. Coyle, 117 N.W.2d 290 (N.D. 1962); In re Jacobson, 240 S.C. 436.
126 S.E.2d 346 (1959).
'"There may be... inmates who are qualified to assist . . . a prisoner, and who
are ... capable of advising them objectively, of encouraging their appeal to the
courts when authorized, and discouraging the same when no good cause of action
exists." White v. Blackwell, 277 F. Supp. 211, 219 (N.D. Ga. 1967).
2Id. at 219-20.
